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THE ROLE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND
SETTLEMENTS IN SUPERFUND ENFORCEMENT
In December 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as "Superfund," 1 to deal with the immense and growing
problem of hazardous waste disposal. Superfund's twin -aims were to
provide for the rapid cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to provide
incentives for the careful handling of chemical waste. 2 To accomplish
these aims, the statute created a $1.6 billion fund 3 financed through new
taxes on the oil and chemical industries, 4 appropriations from general
revenues, 5 and damages and penalties from lawsuits arising under the
statute. 6 Superfund permitted the federal and state governments to take
immediate action to clean up hazardous waste sites and then to sue
those responsible for the sites to recover cleanup costs. 7 Congress thus
recognized the need for expedited cleanup operations and concluded
that litigation regarding liability for cleanup costs could postpone remedial efforts indefinitely. 8
1
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp.
V 1981)).
2 See Note,Joint and Several LiabilityforHazardous Waste Releases under Superflnd, 68 VA. L.
REV. 1157, 1173 (1982).
3 See Implementation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1981: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on EnvironmentalPollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment andPublic Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981) (statement of Sen. Chafee, Subcommittee
Chairman) [hereinafter cited as Implementation Hearings].
4 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981). Fees from the chemical and oil industries
finance $1.4 billion of the Fund. See Implementation Hearings,supra note 3, at 3 (7/8's of Fund
comes from industry). The Internal Revenue Service has issued temporary regulations to
collect these environmental taxes. Treas. Reg. §§ 57.6011(a)-i to .6302(c)(1) (1982). The
collection procedures will be similar to those currently used to collect manufacturer's excise
taxes. See IRS Issues Temporaq Regulations For Collecting Taxes to Finance Superfund, 12 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 405 (July 24, 1981).
5 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (b) (2) (Supp. V 198 1). General revenue appropriations finance $220
million of the Fund. See Implementation Hearings,supra note 3, at 3 (1/8 of Fund comes from
appropriated funds).
6 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(1)(D)-(E) (Supp. V 1981).
7 See in/ta notes 34-38 and accompanying text. See also 126 CONG. REc. H9162 (daily
ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio) (Superfund will "provide the authority for immediate cleanup and containment response. . . and provide the authority to then go and determine who it is that is responsible"). Superfund, however, does not cover cleanup of federal
facilities. See EPA Says Superfund Covers All Releases, Mining Sites But Not Federal Facilities, 13
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 324 (July 2, 1982).
8 See 126 CONG. REc. H9162 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (Congressman Florio, who introduced bill eventually enacted as Superfund, remarked that problem of hazardous waste,
"cannot tolerate the slow pace that has been the traditional response"). See also Comment,
GeneratorLiabilityunder Superfundfor Clean-upof AbandonedHazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1229, 1231-32 (1982) ("In theory, at least, Superfund will eliminate. . . delays be-
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The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, has relied
upon methods of enforcement other than those originally prescribed by
Congress, and has thereby partially frustrated the aims of Superfund.
This Note examines the EPA's neglect of Superfund's original enforcement provisions and details the EPA's use of injunctive relief 9 and negotiated settlements' 0 in lieu of government cleanup actions. The Note
then focuses on the rationales behind the EPA's failure to enforce
Superfund in a manner consistent with congressional intent."l Finally,
the Note concludes that Congress must enact new legislation to provide
the EPA and the courts with a more effective enforcement tool than
2
Superfund to remedy America's hazardous waste problems.'
I
FEDERAL REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE

A. The Scope of the Hazardous Waste Problem
Improper handling and disposal of hazardous waste has created latent and emerging threats to our health' 3 and environment. 14 The Love
Canal incident in Niagara Falls, New York,' 5 and other recent discoveries of improper waste disposal 16 illustrate the nature of this threat. The
cause the government will have both the authority and the funds to begin clean-up efforts as
soon as the hazardous site is targeted.").
9 See in/a notes 39-83 and accompanying text.
10 See in/ra notes 84-118 and accompanying text.
1I See in/a notes 119-52 and accompanying text.
12 See in/a notes 153-89 and accompanying text.
13 Toxic wastes pose a variety of threats to human health, including cancer, birth defects, neurological and behavioral disorders, kidney damage, heart and lung disease, acute
and chronic skin rash, and poisoning. See, e.g., Toxic SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMM., U.S.
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, Toxic CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION xiv (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Toxic SUBSTANCES]. See generally Health Efctr of Hazardous Waste Dipo-

salPractices:Joint HearingBefore the Subcomm.on Health andScientif Research of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciag, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Superfund created a new agency within the Public Health Service to study and monitor the
health effects of toxic substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (Supp. V 1981).
14 Hazardous wastes can cause air pollution, water contamination, explosions, fire, direct poisoning, and other environmental damage. See Costle & Beck, Attack on Hazardous
Waste: Turning Back the Toxic Tide, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 425, 426 (1980). The EPA is currently
spending $10,000,000 to study the health and environmental effects of improper disposal of
hazardous waste. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES POSE
INVESTIGATION, EVALUATION, SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL PROBLEMS 55, 59 (1981).
15 See generally M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY Toxic

CHEMICALS (1980) (describing Love Canal incident which led to public recognition of seriousness of hazardous waste pollution); REPORT OF THE NEW YORK OFFICE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, LOVE CANAL: PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB (1978) (same).
16 See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND
PUBLIC WORKS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION
FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW

JERSEY, AND
these states).

TEXAS

(Comm. Print 1980) (citing examples of hazardous waste incidents in
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EPA estimates that almost 14,000 hazardous waste disposal sites exist in
the United States, 17 but it cannot accurately estimate the costs of removal and remedial operations because of the pervasiveness of toxic
contamination and seepage. 18 The full extent of the problem thus remains uncertain.
The federal government only recently has become concerned with
hazardous waste disposal. Prior to federal legislation in the area, municipal laws and ordinances regulated the disposal of solid waste. 19 In the
1960s, Congress enacted comprehensive environmental statutes, such as
the Clean Air Act 20 and the Clean Water Act, 2 1 de-emphasizing local
regulation of the environment. The Clean Air Act and other similar
statutes, primarily for administrative convenience, regulated only dis-

17

When the EPA released a list of over 400 of the worst hazardous waste sites targeted

for cleanup under Superfund, Anne Gorsuch, then EPA Administrator, acknowledged that
almost 12,000 hazardous chemical dumps existed in the United States. Shabecoff, 118 Toxic
Dumps Listed in Clean Up, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1982, § 2, at 6, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as 418
Toxic Dumps]; see also Shabecoff, Hazardous Waste Exceeds Estimates, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1983, at Al, col. I (agency survey estimating 150 million metric tons of hazardous waste
generated in 1981-four times higher than previously estimated). Ms. Gorsuch resigned from
her position after a series of congressional investigations. See injfa note 185.
18 Estimates of the cost of proper hazardous waste disposal vary widely. The cost of
establishing a chemical landfill, for example, can range from $50 to $400 per metric ton of
waste. See U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 11 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 219, tables 5-

7 (1980). The EPA has estimated that cleaning up the 1,000-2,000 most hazardous waste sites
will cost between $26 and $44 billion. See Hazardousand Toxic Waste Disposal-Joint Hearings on
S 13411 and S 1480 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1980) (statement of
Thomas C. Jorling, Assistant Administrator, Waste Water Management, Environmental Protection Agency). Proper hazardous waste disposal can cost 10 to 40 times more than improper disposal. See U.S. COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, 8 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 47-48
(1977). Thus, the present waste disposal system has spawned an increasing number of racketeers or "midnight dumpers" who illegally dispose of chemicals for profit. See Organized Crime
Links to the Waste Disposal ndust: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., IstSess. 1 (1981) (statement of Sen.
Dingell, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) (subcommittee
found link between organized crime and illegal dumping of toxic wastes). See also Pursue the
Poisoners, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1982, at A30, col. 1; Connecticut Plant is Accused ofIllegal Dumping
for Years, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1981, at Al, col. 1. In an attempt to control illegal dumping,
"[t]he FBI has agreed to investigate up to 30 hazardous waste cases per year. . . " Remarks
of Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division,
before the American Bar Association Annual Meeting, at 18 (Aug. 9, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Dinkins]. The Justice Department has recently begun a crackdown on "midnight dumpers" by bringing criminal charges before 25 grand juries in 14 states. See US Cracks Down on
Waste Dumpers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
19 See Comment, Hazardous Waste Liabilitp and Compensation: Old Solutions, New Solutions,
No Solutions, 14 CONN. L. REV. 307, 312-13 (1982) (hazardous waste control was traditionally
responsibility of local governments; initially, federal government played a minimal role); see
also Meyer, Compensating Hazardous Waste irtims: RCRA Insuranc Regulations and a Not So
"Super" FundAct, 11 ENvTL. L. 689, 692-93 (1981).
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981).
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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tinct environmental media.22 Congress ultimately realized, however,
that hazardous waste pollution pervaded all aspects of the environment
and required a more comprehensive solution.
B.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

Congress's first attempt at a comprehensive solution to the wastedisposal problem was the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).23 RCRA provided for "cradle-to-grave" regulation 24 of the
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste, establishing prospective standards for the handling of chemical waste. 25 Section 7003 of RCRA permits injunctive relief to prevent
improper waste disposal whenever "hazardous waste [presents] an immi'26
nent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.
Although RCRA was a step in the right direction, it was not the
comprehensive solution needed to remedy the hazardous waste problem.
First, RCRA neither addressed past dumping practices nor mandated
the cleanup of present dangerous waste sites.2 7 Second, RCRA did not
require the generators of hazardous waste to use the most desirable disposal practices.2 8 Third, RCRA failed to provide funds for emergency
22

The four distinct environmental media are surfacewater, groundwater, land, and air.

See THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT: REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 47 (June 1979) [herein-

after cited as THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT].
23 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)). Although RCRA was the first statute specifically addressing the hazardous
waste problem, more than two dozen laws have authorized federal regulation of toxic substances. See TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 13, at 98.

24 Commentators have deemed the RCRA system a "cradle-to-grave" statutory scheme
because subtitle C of the Act traces hazardous wastes from generator, to transporter, to disposal facility. See Goldfarb, The Hazardsof Our Hazardous Waste Poliy, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J.
249, 253 (1979); Note, Liabilityfor Generators of Hazardous Waste: The FailureofExisting Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1049 (1981) (citing Goldfarb).

25 See Di Nal, Hazardous Waste: Environmental Issue of the Eighties, 1981 ABA ENVTL. L.
SYMP. 81, 94 ("RCRA regulations should assure that what has happened in the past will not
happen in the future. . . .'); see also Dinkins, supra note 18, at 3 ("RCRA's primary thrust is
prospective regulation of existing sites.").
26 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (Supp. V 1981).
27 See 126 CONG. REC. H9176 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Brown) (discussion during Superfund debates concerning shortcomings of RCRA due to magnitude of
hazardous waste problem).
28 One commentator noted that RCRA failed to achieve its regulatory goals because it
divorced the regulation of disposal practices from the regulation of waste generators. See Note,
supra note 24, at 1051 (1981). This commentator argued that "RCRA actually encourages
generators to contract for off-site disposal with independent contractors and thereby avoid the
more stringent regulations that would apply if the generator disposed of its own waste." Id at
1052-53. Another commentator has suggested that Superfund also encourages irresponsible
disposal practices. Rea, Hazardous Waste Pollution: The Needfor a Diffrent Statutory Approach, 12
ENVTL. L. 443, 461 (1982) ("[The] transfer of liability to the Post-Closure Liability Fund only
five years after facility closure may foster disposal in short-lived facilities and relieve those
responsible for contamination of all costs of mitigative measures.").
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containment or cleanup of waste disposal sites. 29 Finally, RCRA allowed the states to continue to regulate the siting of waste disposal
30
facilities.
C.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund)

Responding to the deficiencies of RCRA 3 1 and the public pressure
created by the Love Canal incident, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of
1980-Superfund. 32 Superfund's legislative history clearly demonstrates
33
that it was a compromise bill.

29 See Eschwege, Implementing the Resource Conserationand Recovery Act: Problems of the Present, Recommendationsfor the Future, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 467, 481 (1980).
30 See Goldfarb, supra note 24, at 258 & n.42. The EPA often faces tremendous state and
local opposition to the siting of hazardous waste facilities because state and local officials do
not care to admit that they have a hazardous waste problem. See, e.g., 13,000 Toxic Waste
Dumps Will ThreatenPublicHealth, Wheeling News Register, Dec. 21, 1982, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as 13,000 Toxic Waste Dumps/. The EPA arguably could have designated priorities
for site cleanup faster without state regulation of the siting of disposal facilities and with less
opposition from state and local officials.
31
See Comment, supra note 19, at 307 (Congress enacted Superfund "to alleviate some of
the major deficiencies of. . .the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act"); id at 315-16
("That RCRA was not the panacea Congress had intended became apparent after Love Canal focused national attention on hazardous wastes.") (footnote omitted).
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981).
33 Congress considered three different Superfund bills: (1) H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H2490 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1980); (2) H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; (3) S.
1480, 96th Cong., IstSess., 126 CONG. REC. S9174 (daily ed. July 11, 1979).
Senate Bill 1480 was the most comprehensive version of Superfund that Congress considered. This bill would have imposed strict liability and included a modified joint and several
liability plan that added a right of contribution for liable waste generators. S. 1480, 96th
Cong., IstSess., 126 CONG. REc. S9174 (daily ed. July 11, 1979). The bill also would have
provided for a $4.1 billion fund over six years. Id
Congress extensively debated provisions providing for a federal cause of action for persons injured by toxic wastes, but failed to adopt them. The enacted Superfund does require a
report concerning "the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in providing
legal redress" for toxic substance related injury to persons and the environment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9651 (e) (Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of currently existing remedies, see Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutog Remedies ForHazardous Waste Injuries, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 117
(1980).
While the Senate debated S. 1480, the House of Representatives passed a less comprehensive bill, applying to inactive waste sites only and creating only a $600 million fund. H.R.
7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H2490 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1980). The conference
committee then introduced a compromise bill, which the House considered under a suspension of its rules and passed after limited debate. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG.
REG. HI 1,802 (Dec. 3, 1980).
Congress ultimately passed a bill that was substantially different from those that were
considered and debated. Because Congress significantly altered the law, the numerous congressional hearings, reports, and debates concerning Superfund must be used carefully in determining legislative intent. See generally Grad, A Legislative Histor of the Comprehensive
EnvironmentalResponse, Compensationand Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENV'rL

L. 1 (1982) (detailing Superfund's legislative history); SUPERFUND-A LEGISLATIVE His-
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The statute contains four major provisions designed to facilitate

prompt EPA cleanup of present hazardous waste sites followed by EPA
legal action to recover cleanup costs from those responsible for the
wastes. 34 Section 104 grants the President broad authority to respond to
hazardous waste problems. 35 Section 105 calls for the creation of a National Contingency Plan to establish guidelines for governmental response. 36 Section 107 identifies a class of responsible parties and defines
the scope of their liability.37 Finally section 111 provides that
Superfund money shall cover governmental costs of cleanups under section 104.38
II
THE PRESENT PATTERN OF SUPERFUND ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS

A.

The EPA's Use of Section 106: The Injunctive Relief Provision

Although under Superfund the federal government and the states
were to undertake cleanup of hazardous waste sites and later be reimbursed for their efforts, EPA officials have chosen instead to seek federal
court injunctions ordering private cleanup of toxic substances. 39 Section
106 permits the federal government to secure such injunctive relief in
federal district court. Section 106(a) states in part:
[fIn addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the President determines that there may be an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous
TORY (Environmental Law Institute 1982) (compiles all bills, hearings, and debates on
Superfund by topic).
34 See supra text accompanying note 7.
35 The Act authorizes the President to take any responsive measure he "deems necessary
to protect the public health or welfare or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. V
1981).
36 The guidelines must include, inter alia, (1) methods for discovering and investigating
hazardous waste sites; (2) methods for evaluating and remedying any releases of toxic substances; (3) methods for determining the appropriate extent of government removal and remedial operations; (4) methods for determining the appropriate roles and responsibilities of
federal, state, and local governments in effectuating the plan; and (5) methods of assuring
that remedial operations are cost-effective. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (Supp. V 1981). See injra note 83
(discussion of National Contingency Plan).
37 The responsible parties include owners and operators of vessels, owners or operators of
waste disposal facilities, contractors who arrange for the disposal of hazardous waste, and
transporters of hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. V 1981).
38 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982); see also U.S Files a Suit with Caifomia over
Waste Site, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1983, at Al, col. 6, B4, col. 5 (noting that "the Justice
Department recently. . sought an injunction 'to compel the defendants [waste generators]
to pay all costs of removal and remedial measures.' ").
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substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney General of the
United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such
danger or threat, and the district court of the United States in the
district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such
relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may require.40
Because EPA policy has favored wide-scale application of section 106,41
an analysis of that section is essential to assess the success of the EPA's
enforcement of the toxic waste cleanup laws.
1.

Substantive Liability under Section 106

Until the Supreme Court's recent decision in Milwaukee v. llinois

(Milwaukee II), 42 it was unclear whether section 106 had a jurisdictional
or substantive basis. Cases decided since Milwaukee II indicate that section 106 does confer substantive liability upon responsible parties.
Cases interpreting section 7003 of RCRA 43 are pertinent to this in44
quiry because section 7003 is very similar to section 106 of Superfund.
40 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). Section 106 also authorizes the President to issue
administrative orders "to protect public health and welfare and the environment." Id The
President can delegate this power to the EPA administrator. See Frost & Cross, LegalStandards
Under Section 106 ofqSuperfid, HAZARDOUS WASTE REP. 8 (Trends & Analyses Supp. Aug.
1982). A reasonable interpretation of the administrative order provision demands that
§ 106's imminent and substantial endangerment requirement and its "mandate to act in the
public interest consistent with the equities of the case" apply to administrative orders. Id at
12. Moreover, because an administrative order is usually issued in a summary, ex parte
proceedng, the EPA should issue an administrative order only when a site requires emergency
action. Finally, parties subject to an administrative order have a right to de novo review in
federal court if they do not receive an administrative hearing. Id
Because of recent allegations that the EPA had made "sweetheart deals" with industry
groups, the Agency had temporarily ordered a halt to the issuance of administrative orders.
That halt is no longer in effect. See EPA Regions to Issue SuperAnd Orders; Daniel's Directive
Superseded by Thomas, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2333 (Apr. 22, 1983).
41
See Guidelines for Using the Imminent Hazard Enforcement and Emergency Response Authorities of Superfund and Other Statutes, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,664-65 (May 13, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Guidelines] ("[I]t is EPA policy to continue to pursue enforcement actions as an alternative to or complementary with Fund-financed response activities."). See also
Dinkins, supra note 18, at 8 (noting that Justice Department has initiated more than 60 suits
at EPA's request and has settled 20 of those cases, obtaining more than $82 million for private-party cleanups).
42

451 U.S. 304 (1981).

42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (Supp. V 1981).
Compare § 106(a) of Superfund, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981) with § 7003(a) of
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (Supp. V 1981), which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence that the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any
solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit
on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court to immediately
restrain any person contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to stop such handling, storage, treatment, transportation
or disposal or to take such other action as may be necessary. The Administrator shall provide notice to the affected State of any such suit. The Administrator may also, after notice to the affected State, take other action under this
43
44
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Early cases on section 7003 suggested that the imminent and substantial

endangerment provision was only jurisdictional. 45 The court in United
States v. Midwest Solvent Recovey Inc."46 for example, reasoned that section

7003 could not confer substantive liability because it appeared to contain no standards for determining the unlawfulness of conduct. 47 The
court also found the legislative history of section 7003 too "sketchy" to
support substantive liability. 48 Instead, the court looked to see whether
49
it could grant injunctive relief under federal common law.
Since the Milwaukee II decision, however, cases have held that section 7003 has a substantive basis. 50 In Milwaukee II, the Court found
that Congress had effectively preempted the application of federal common law by adopting a comprehensive regulatory program. 5' Accordsection including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary
to protect public health and the environment.
45
United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-34 (D. Conn.
1980); United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 143-44 (N.D. Ind.
1980); see also Hinds, Liability UnderFederalLawfor Hazardous Waste Injuries, 6 HARV. ENVTL L.
REv. 1, 33 (1982) (suggesting that because § 106 is so vague, courts will probably construe it
as a jurisdictional statute and use the "federal common law of nuisance to flesh it out").
46
484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
47

Id

48 Id. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976) extends federal jurisdiction to all actions
brought by the United States, § 7003 was unnecessary as a jurisdictional statute. See R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 329 (1981). The court,
however, failed to consider this argument.
49 484 F. Supp. at 144-45. Under federal common law, a court may issue a preliminary
injunction if (1) the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law and will be irreparably harmed if
the injunction is not issued, (2) the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened
harm the injunction may inflict upon defendant, (3) the plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits, and (4) the granting of the preliminary injunction will not disserve
the public interest. Id
50 United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329 (N.D.
Ohio 1981); accord United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.NJ. 1981), ffd, 688 F.2d 204
(3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
51 451 U.S. at 317. The issue for the Court was whether the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 had supplanted federal common law. Id. at 310 n.4. The
Court assumed that Congress, not the courts, should articulate the standards of federal law.
Id at 317. The Court then found that congressional regulation of the entire field of water
pollution control had preempted federal common law remedies formerly available to the
plaintiff. Id at 324-25. Moreover, the Court argued that invocation of common law was
"peculiarly inappropriate in areas as complex as water pollution control." Id at 325.
In a dissent in which Justices Marshall and Stevens concurred, Justice Blackmun argued
that "Congress intended no such extinction" of federal common law. Id at 333. Moreover,
the dissent found the " 'automatic displacement' approach" inadequate because: (1) it did
not reflect the role of federal common law in resolving disputes between the states; and (2) it
ignored the fact that "federal common law may complement congressional action in the fulfillment of federal policies." Id. at 334.
The Court later held that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 also preclude federal common law nuisance actions. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1 (1981). Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissented, arguing that "[d]espite their comprehensive enforcement mechanisms, both statutes expressly preserve all legal remedies otherwise
available." Id at 29.
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ingly, courts could no longer look to federal common law for standards
to apply in an action for injunctive relief. In other words, Milwaukee I
limits federal courts to remedies specifically legislated by Congress in
areas as complex as hazardous waste control.
The decision in Milwaukee II prompted the court in United States V.
Diamond Shamrock to consider claims under section 7003 and common
law nuisance separately. 52 Previously, federal common law had worked
to complement congressional action to fulfill federal policies. 53 In Diamond Shamrock, no common law nuisance claims would lie because
RCRA was found to be a comprehensive regulatory program within the
Looking solely at section 7003, however, the
meaning of Milwaukee 1154
court found that its imminent and substantial endangerment requirement, "with rich judicial and statutory histories," provided it with sufficient standards to make it a substantive provision. 55 This sudden
finding of standards in section 7003 appears to be a judicial construction
to allow statutory injunctive relief where it had previously been allowed
by common law.
Similarly, section 106 may be construed as conferring substantive
liability because it contains the imminent and substantial endangerment
provision 56 and because Superfund can be interpreted as a comprehensive regulatory program within the meaning of Milwaukee 11 57 Moreover, because as one commentator noted, "[Superfund] deprived
claimants of their ability to rely on federal common law doctrines to
impose liability for hazardous waste disposal conduct,"5 8 section 106
may be expanded to allow statutory injunctive relief.

52 United States v. Diamond Shamrock, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329, 1332 (N.D.
Ohio 1981); accord United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980)
(court focused attention on whether an imminent and substantial endangerment existed and
held that § 7003 was substantive).
53 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 334 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1332.
55

Id

56 The court in United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill.
1982), found that § 106 conferred substantive liability. The court noted that the plain language of§ 106(a) did not suggest that Congress intended the provision to afford a substantive
basis for liability: "[S]ection 106(a) does not appear to create liability in any [party; it]
authorizes lawsuits and injunctions, but it does not indicate who may be sued or enjoined;
also, it does not specify what one must do to be subject to suit or injunction." Id at 55.
Nevertheless, the decision in Milwaukee II, which apparently precluded relief under federal
common law, made the court reluctant to hold that the statute was exclusively jurisdictional.
Id at 56-57. The court concluded that, whatever the source ofsubstantive law applicable in
a § 106(a) action, it should effectuate Superfund's imminent hazard authority. Id
57 See Dore, The Standardo(Civil Liabilityfor Hazardous Waste DisposalActivity: Some Quirks
of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAw. 260, 272 (1981).

58

Id at 283.
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The Imminent and SubstantialEndangerment Requirement: An
Amorphous Conditionfor Relief Under Section 106

Given the foregoing analysis, hazardous waste must pose a risk of
"imminent and substantial endangerment" to the public or to the environment before a court can issue a preliminary injunction under section
106.59 Because neither Superfund nor its legislative history defines "imminent and substantial endangerment," 6° it is useful to examine other
environmental statutes that contain similarly worded provisions. 6 t The
59 "[W]hen the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial
endangerment" he may require the Attorney General to take action seeking abatement. 42
U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). Direct presidential authorization is not, however, a prerequisite for bringing § 106 claims. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp.
1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). The President can delegate this authority to any person or
agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (Supp. V 1981) ("The President is authorized to delegate and
assign any duties or powers imposed upon or assigned to him and to promulgate any regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter."). President Reagan delegated
his authority under § 106(a) to the EPA in Executive Order 12,316. See Exec. Order No.
12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1981). This delegation, however, does not give the EPA's Administrator
total discretion to determine whether to bring suit. Although the Administrator determines if
there is an imminent and substantial endangerment and can recommend an abatement action "the President retains the power to compel the Attorney General to commence suit if the
Attorney General has declined . . . to do so." Reily Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1113 (emphasis
omitted).
Section 106 also requires the courts to find that the issuance of injunctive relief accords
with the equities of the case. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). One commentator thus
suggested that § 106 contains a two-prong test. See Frost & Cross, supra note 40, at 10. This
two-prong interpretation presumably does not conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), because that decision did not prevent Congress
from preserving federal common law. See Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473,
476 (7th Cir. 1982). If the "equities of the case" provision is an admonition to the court to
apply equitable principles, see Frost & Cross, supra note 40, at 10, courts would look to the
special conditions under which equity would permit abatement actions. See general Leubsdorf, The SandardforPreliminay Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1978). These conditions
would restrict the availability of abatement actions under § 106.
60 The legislative history on § 106 mirrors the legislative history of the entire act. Prior
bills offered in both the House and the Senate were not substantially similar to § 106. See S.
1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(b) (1980); S. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 603() (1980); H.R.
7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3041(1) (a) (1980); (all compiled in SUPE'RFUND--A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 149-62 (Environmental Law Institute 1982)). The Senate report accompanying the
Senate abatement authority provision stated, "[Section 3(b)] is intended to decrease reliance
on the Fund and on Federal response where responsible parties can take necessary control,
removal, or remedial actions." S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1980). The House
report which accompanied the House abatement authority provision also commented upon
its version of the section stating that "the 'emergency response authority' provided by the
Administrator of EPA in H.R. 7020 is entirely too broad." H.R. REP. No. 1016, Part I, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1980) (supplemental views of Reps. Broyhill, Devine, Collins, Loeffler, and
Stockman). Yet, the House abatement authority provision was much more detailed than
§ 106 as enacted. However, because the proposed sections are so dissimilar to § 106, the statements on those sections do not lend much insight into the statute.
61 For example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), § 7003, 42
U.S.C. § 6973(a) (Supp. V 1981), the Clean Air Act, § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (Supp. V
1981), and the Clean Water Act, § 504(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (Supp. V 1981) all require
findings of imminent and substantial endangerment.
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legislative histories of these provisions indicate that courts and regulatory agencies should invoke such provisions only in unusual circum62
stances and not for chronic or generally recurring pollution problems.
The district court, in United States v.Wade, 63 restricted the use of section
106 to emergency situations, 64 and was thus consistent with the interpretations of analogous environmental statutes.
Nevertheless, courts have failed to confine consistently the application of the imminent and substantial endangerment provisions of environmental statutes to emergencies. For example, one court permitted an
abatement action under section 7003 of RCRA "to eliminate any risks
posed by toxic wastes. ' ' 65 Similarly in United States v. Rei47v Tar & Chemical Corp., 66 the court broadly applied section 106 where a recurring
groundwater contamination problem threatened to develop into an imminent and substantial threat to health or the environment. 67 These
conflicting court decisions reflect the uncertainty attending section 106's
imminent and substantial endangerment requirement.

3. PotentialDefendants in Section 106 Abatement Actions
Section 106 also fails to clearly identify the potential defendants in
an abatement action. Although section 107(l)-(4) lists numerous possible defendants,6 section 106 contains no such list, nor any reference to
section 107.69 Because section 107 is the sole provision in the Act identifying possible defendants, section 107 defendants are arguably liable
under other provisions of the Act, including section 106. The Rei' y Tar
62
Cf H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. l19,reprintedin 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1938, 1954 (statements made regarding § 108(K) of Air Quality Act of 1967, the
original imminent hazard provision); S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1970)
(amendments to Clean Air Act suggesting that government must clearly establish potential
for harm before it can use imminent hazard authority).
63 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
64

Id

at 794.

65 United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Two District Courts
Decide Difterently on Waste Generators' Liability Under RCRA, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 689 (Sept.
17, 1982) (noting difference between Wade and Price decisions).
66 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
67 Id at 1114. The recent case of United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp.
54 (N.D. Ill.
1982), added to the confusion surrounding the definition of "imminent and
substantial endangerment" by following Rei!'y Tar's broad reading of § 106. Id at 57. The
Outboard Marine court acknowledged that it could not reconcile the Rill Tar interpretation
with the narrow construction given § 106 in United States v. Wade. Id. at 58 n.3. The court
rejected the defendant's contention that the two cases could be distinguished because in Reil'y
Tar the government sued the defendant under both §§ 106 and 107, whereas in Wade the
government sued the defendant only under § 106. Id. The failure of the court in Outboard
Marine to reconcile these divergent interpretations of § 106 emphasizes the uncertainty attending the "imminent and substantial endangerment" requirement.
68 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. V 1981). For a list of the potential defendants
under § 107 of Superfund, see supra note 37.
69 See Hinds, supra note 45, at 32 (noting that absence of cross-reference in either § 106
or § 107 supports this argument).
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court, for example, relied on section 107's identification of potential defendants, and on section 106's reference to the "equities of the case" to
70
justify its invocation of section 106 against the defendants.
Other courts, however, have rejected this approach. In United States
v. Wade, 71 the court refused to find that section 106 applied to parties
that had been offsite generators but were no longer generating hazardous wastes. 72 In support of this narrow application of the statute, the
Wade court pointed to "the absence of any evidence that Congress intended section 106 to [apply to such defendants] and. . . the clear and
carefully detailed legislative provision of another route to the same
73
result."
4. Relief Available Under Section 106
Section 106 also fails to clearly define the relief that it allows. The
74
district court and court of appeals decisions in United States v. Price,
interpreting section 7003 of RCRA, reflect the court's confusion concerning the relief available under that provision. Given the similarities
between sections 7003 and 106, 75 the decisions suggest similar uncertainties under section 106.
In Price, the EPA sought an injunction ordering the defendant to
fund a diagnostic study of the site's toxic waste effects on a city's water
supply and to provide an alternate water supply to affected homeowners. 76 The district court noted that it must determine the appropriate
relief on a case-by-case basis to achieve the purposes of RCRA, which in
turn involves consideration of traditional equitable criteria.7 7 Applying
equitable criteria, the court found that "[a] plaintiff cannot transform a
claim for damages into an equitable action by asking for an injunction
that orders the payment of money" and denied the request for the
78
injunction.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, 79 but stated
that the district court had "an unduly restrictive view of its remedial
70
546 F. Supp. at 1113. However, if the reference in § 106 to equity is an admonition to
courts to apply traditional principles of equity, those principles could limit the potential class
of defendants under § 106. For example, parties who bear a remote relationship to and have
no knowledge of the prescribed conduct are not proper defendants in equitable actions. See,
e.g., Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 605 F.2d 586, 589-90 (1st Cir. 1979).
71
546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
72
Id. at 792-94.
73
Id at 794.
74
523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), afd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
75
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
76
523 F. Supp. at 1067.
77

Id

Id (quoting Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.),cert. denied, 441 U.S.
961 (1979)). The court in United States v. Wade, 549 F. Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1982), also
approved ofJaffee with regard to § 7003 claims.
79
688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
78
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powers . . .under traditional equitable doctrines." 80 The court found
that Congress intended to invoke "nothing less than the full equity powers of the federal courts" under RCRA when toxic wastes threatened the
public health or the environment. 81 The court indicated, however, that
denial of the preliminary injunction might have been the fairest solution
because the requested relief would bind only a few of the more than
8 2
thirty-five defendants.
Determining the relief available under section 106 involves a similar "balancing of statutory goals and other public interests." 8 3 The relief available will often depend largely on the factual situation before
the court.
B.

The EPA's Use of Settlement Agreements To Clean Up Toxic
Wastes

1. A Glimpse at the Mechanics ofSettlement
Before initiating enforcement activity, the EPA attempts to notify
potential defendants in an effort to develop a satisfactory cleanup agree-

ment. 84 Toward this end, the EPA recently released a prioritized list of
over 400 hazardous waste sites found in the United States.8 5 The hazard
ranking system 86 permits the EPA to proceed on a worst-first basis acting against the most dangerous sites first.
After identifying the sites, the EPA targets the largest generators of
80

81

Id

at 211.

Id at 214.
82 Id
83 Frost & Cross, supra note 40, at 11. Section 105 of Superfund might also have limited
the nature of injunctive relief available under § 106. Se id Section 105 calls for a National
Contingency Plan to establish procedures for dealing with release of toxic substances and
requiring that "actions to minimize damage from hazardous substances releases" shall comply with the strictures of the plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (Supp. V 1981). This language and
congressional statements at the time of enactment indicate that abatement actions under
§ 106 must also follow the guidelines of the plan to the greatest extent possible. See Frost &
Cross, supra note 40, at 11; 126 CONG. R c. S215,008 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of
Sen. Stafford) ("[W]e would expect the courts to examine the particular orders or expenditures from the fund to determine whether they were proper, given the standards of the act
and of the national contingency plan."). However, the plan that the EPA actually published
specifically denied that it applied to § 106, ignoring congressional intent. See National Oil
and Hazardous Contingency Plan, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (1982).
84 See Guidelines, supra note 41, at 20,666. A notice letter, however, is not a legal prerequisite for cost recovery. See Parties Liable For Superfind Response Cost Despite iming of Notice
Letters, EPA Says, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 721 (Sept. 24, 1982).
85 See 418 Toxic Dumps, supra note 17. The dumps are scattered from Maine to American
Samoa although two-thirds are located in a dozen states led by New Jersey, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania. Id
86 Appendix A of the National Contingency Plan, see supra note 83, delineates the hazard ranking system. Commentators have criticized the system because it factors in population
density, thereby giving little health protection to sparsely populated areas with high levels of
contamination. See EPA's Superfund Poliy Criticized By OTA In Testimony to House Panel, 12
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 898 (Nov. 20, 1981).
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waste at those sites for settlement negotiations.

7

The large waste gener-

ators consist primarily of companies that arrange for the disposal or
treatment of hazardous wastes created by their production processes.
Although smaller, less identifiable generator companies, transporters,
landfill owners, and operators are also liable for cleanup costs under
Superfund, 8 8 the EPA has not focused on these potential defendants for
settlement negotiations, 89 partly because of the low volume share con-

tributed by these polluters. 9° Administrative costs and the inconveniences of litigation also dissuade the EPA from contacting such minor
participants. 9 1
Once the EPA has chosen a generator for settlement negotiations,
it allows the generator to propose remedial action. 92 An administrative order or a judicial consent decree must then accompany any settlement agreement adopting such private remedial operations.9 3 For
example, in United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastic Corp., 94 the court,
after noting the "clear policy in favor of encouraging settlements,"9 5
approved a private settlement agreement to clean up a chemical
dumpsite in Niagara, New York, 96 and issued a corresponding consent
87 See Dinkins, supra note 18, at 9. The EPA recently announced that it had reached
approximately 20 settlements creating $82 million in privately financed cleanups. See Government's Update on Canying Out SuperfundMeets with Criticismat Hearing, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 469
(Aug. 6, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Government's Update].
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)-(4) (Supp. V 1981) (stressing that "any person" is liable if
he meets certain causal conditions subject to specific defenses outlined in § 9607(b)).
89 See Dinkins, supra note 18, at 9. Assistant Attorney General Dinkins noted that seeking recovery from minimal participants would overextend the doctrine of joint and several
liability and waste the government's resources. Id
90 See Dinkins, supra note 18, at 11. Although volume share is the primary consideration
in EPA settlement agreements, the toxicity of the chemicals contributed to the dump site and
other factors may affect those agreements. Id The EPA's negotiation costs may also affect its
settlement agreements. See S38 Million DollarPact, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1982, at A18, col. 1
[hereinafter cited as 538 Million Dollar Pact];see also Record Voluntagy Cleanup Settlement Reached
For Velsicol Site UnderSuperfund, 13 ENV'T REP.(BNA) 1165 (Nov. 26, 1982). Defendants' past
cleanup activity at a site does not affect the settlement agreements because the EPA refuses to
award credit for that activity. See Dinkins, supra note 18, at II (arguing that EPA cannot
consider past voluntary activity because "only future expenditures and undertakings . . .
form the basis of the relief" government seeks).
91 See Dinkins, supra note 18, at 9.
92 See id at 16; see also Guidelines, supra note 41, at 20,666 (ifthese settlement efforts
prove "unsatisfactory," EPA then decides whether to use Superfund for site cleanup or to use
some other enforcement method).
93 "The reason for this should be obvious. It would be unwise for EPA to allow cleanup
activity to proceed if the government could not enforce its agreement quickly if disputes
arise." Dinkins, supra note 18, at 16. For an example of a consent decree, see United States v.
Solvents Recovery Serv., No. 79-704 (D.Conn. Dec. 9, 1982).
94 540 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
95 Id at 1072 (quoting Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union, 514 F.2d 767,
771 (2d Cir. 1 97 5 ), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976)).
96 Id at 1079-80. In approving the settlement, the court considered the fairness and
adequacy of its terms and to what extent the settlement was not unlawful, unreasonable, or
against public policy. Id at 1072. The court found that the agreement satisfied these condi-
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decree. 97 Such judicial action is an integral component of the mechanics
of settlement agreements.
2.

The EPA s Inconsistent Use of Dual-Track Procedureand BiJfrcated
Settlements

The EPA has stated that it is employing a "dual-track" procedure,98 in which it pursues voluntary cleanup negotiations with generators while simultaneously planning to undertake the cleanup itself using
Superfund. Despite such claims, the current administration has pursued
a policy of negotiating with large industries to have them undertake
cleanup operations, thus enabling the EPA to avoid its own Superfund
cleanup operations. 99
The EPA has also maintained that it is negotiating bifurcated settlement agreements, whereby the EPA preserves the right to sue the
larger settling companies more than once by settling with regard to only
particular phases of the cleanup operations. °° The bifurcated settlement reached at the Chem-Dyne site in Hamilton, Ohio, is a recent example. 10 1 The EPA negotiated a $2.4 million settlement with various
generators at the site and released them from only one phase of cleanup
that additional remedial work
responsibility. 0 2 The EPA emphasized
10 3
would require additional settlements.
The EPA has been inconsistent in this area as well. In a recent $38
million negotiated settlement with Velsicol Chemical Company, the
tions and addressed the hazardous waste problem "to the fullest extent of currently existing
technology." Id at 1080.
97
Id at 1080.
98 See Dinkins, supra note 18, at 14.
99 See S38 Million Dollar Pact, supra note 90; see also New EPA Land DisposalRegulations
'Workable; Bar Association Panel Told, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 528 (Aug. 20, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as New EPA Land Disposal Regulations]. Steven Ramsey, Chief of the Environmental
Enforcement Section of the Department of Justice's Land and Natural Resources Division
noted that even if responsible parties cannot be found or are insolvent, the fund will not be
used. Id at 529.
100 See Dinkins,supra note 18, at 12-13. William A. Sullivan, EPA Enforcement Counsel,
has issued a guidance memo stating that
fa]bsent highly unusual circumstances, a total release from future liability
should not be granted unless the party commits to undertaking total cleanup
or until the agency understands the full scope and expense of the required
cleanup and is able to determine that a settlement offer represents a responsible party's fair share of the total cleanup.
EPA Official Says Settlement Agreements Appropriatefor Short- Tem Waste Cleanups, 12 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 1055, 1055 (Jan. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as EPA Oficial].
1o
See 112 Companies Agree To Provide $2.4 Millionfor Chem-Dyne Cleanup, EPA Sues 25 Nonsettling Parties, HAZARDOUS WASTE REP. 2 (Sept. 6, 1982).
102
Id at 2-3. Two hundred eighty-nine potentially responsible parties were identified.
The parties decided how to apportion their costs. Id at 2. The EPA asked for an injunction
against the nonsettling parties for cleanup and reimbursement for monies the agency had
already spent as well as for future expenses. Id at 2-3.
Id at 3.
103
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EPA released the company from all liability for cleanup operations at
four waste sites in St. Louis, Michigan,' °4 instead of pursuing the bifur0
cated settlement approach)

3.

5

The Plight of Small Generators Under the EPA s Settlement Scheme

The EPA's policy of settling first with the larger generators and
possibly releasing them from all future liability has created controversy
among the smaller generators of hazardous waste. 0 6 The smaller generators have accused the EPA of not treating the generators equally and of
undermining the solidarity of all generators by fostering the formation
of small alliances of large companies that receive special treatment from
10 7
the EPA.
The smaller generators argue in particular that the EPA's settlement policy enables the larger companies to avoid liability for groundwater damage. Some EPA-negotiated settlements, for example, cover
only the cost of studies and surfacewater cleanup.108 The groundwater
cleanup, however, is by far the most expensive and long-term type of
operation that needs to be undertaken. 0 9
Moreover, settlements that release larger generators from the liabil-

ity accompanying groundwater cleanup operations may heavily burden
104
105

See S38 Million Dollar Pact, supra note 90.
One commentator has stated on the subject of government settlements that
[t]he government has indicated its willingness to give a release to a company
for liability for cleanup costs paid, and may be willing to indicate that the
amounts expended were reasonable based on information then available. It is
not currently the policy of the government to give either an unconditional
release from all future liability or an indemnification against possible subsequent liability for contribution to other joint tortfeasors.
Hall, The Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Waste Management, 38 Bus. LAw. 593, 60405 (1983). It is difficult to determine whether the EPA has used a consistent settlement agreement approach because the parties rarely disclose the terms of settlement agreements. United
States v. Petro-Processors of La., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 543 (M.D. La. 1982) clearly demonstrates
the secretiveness surrounding these agreements. The opinion stated that the parties had told
the news media that a court order prohibited their disclosure of the agreement. Id. at 546.
Judge Polozola clarified the record, stating that the parties chose to keep the information
secret and that the court had no objection to releasing the information to the public. Id. at
545. The judge found that "public officials and private industry have intentionally misled the
public and the news media by not fully disclosing facts in order to promote their own selfish
gains." Id at 543.
106 See Moore, ProposedPacton Toxic Dumps Called Unfair, Legal Times, Oct. 18, 1982, at 1,
col. 4.
107

Id.

108 Reported examples of settlements covering only removal action include sites in Seymour, Indiana, St. Louis, Michigan, and Hamilton, Ohio. See id; Hamilton, Ohio, Struggles with
Massive Toxic Waste Cleanup, Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1982, at A10, col. 1; 838 Million Pact,
supra note 90. Hugh M. Kaufman, Assistant to the Director of the Environmental Protection
Agency's division on Hazardous Site Control, argued that the St. Louis, Michigan settlement
"sen[t] out a clear signal that companies could negotiate and wind up paying only administrative costs." Id
109 See Moore, supra note 106.
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smaller nonsettling generators who may lack a right of contribution
against their larger, jointly liable, settling counterparts., 10 Federal
courts will recognize and enforce a right to contribution only if Congress
has authorized it. I I The Justice Department has argued that section
107(e)(2) of Superfund provides this necessary authorization.' 1 2 When
examined more closely, however, in light of Superfund's tortured legislative history,' 13 the language of section 107(e) (2) supporting this position
appears inconclusive.' 14 Some commentators have further argued that
10 See Largest oluntary Cleanup Settlement Announcedfor Seymore Site Under Superfund, 13
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 877, 878 (Oct. 19, 1982). (James Rogers, a lawyer for one of the small
generators, noted that as a result of such settlement with a larger generator, "it appears that
the small generators, who probably had far less opportunity to know of any of the activities
being'conducted. . . will each pay. . . twice that which the largest generators will pay on a
percentage basis.").
I I I See Texas Indus. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
112 The Department of Justice has interpreted § 107(e)(2) of Superfund as creating a
right of contribution among parties liable under § 107. Subsection 107(e)(2) provides:
Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions of paragraph (1) of this
subsection, shall bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or any other
person subject to liability under this section, or a guarantor, has or would
have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise against any person.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The Department ofJustice has contended that "[t]his
provision . . . confirms that a defendant held liable for response costs has the right to seek
contribution from any other person responsible for a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance." 126 CONG. REc. H 1,788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement submitted on
behalf of the Department by Rep. Florio).
113 In an earlier Senate bill, the Senate showed clear intent to create a right of contribution. The language it used to create this right is instructive:
In any action brought under this section or section 6(c) of this Act [the section
imposing joint and several liability for damages and removal costs], a person
held jointly and severally liable with one or more other persons is entitled to
seek contribution from such persons to the extent of the proportionate liability of such persons.
126 CONG. Rsc. 514,941 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). If the Senate had intended to create a
right of contribution in the Superfund compromise eventually enacted, it arguably would
have used language as specific and clear as the language it had used in this earlier bill. Cf
Rodburg & Percell, Contribution Among Defendants in Hazardous Waste Litigation, 3 CHEMICAL &
RADIATION WASTE LIT. REP. 591, 600 (1982). On the other hand, congressional compromises are notorious for omitting substantive sections of laws that Congress intended to
enact. For example, even though Congress omitted statutory language imposing strict liability, courts still may interpret the statute as imposing strict liability. See Faron & Feldman,
Superjund Liabilip Outline, 3 CHEMICAL & RADIATION WASTE LIT. REP. 133, 149 (1982).
114 The cogency of the procontribution argument based on § 107(e)(2) of Superfund, see
supra note 112 and accompanying text, fades when that subsection is analyzed in conjunction
with the subsection immediately preceding it. Subsection 107(e)(1) provides:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall
be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility or
from any person who may be liable for a release or threat of release under this
section, to any other person the liability imposed under this section. Nothing
in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The first part of this subsection applies strictly to
indemnification agreements and not to contribution. The plain language of the second sentence of this subsection, however, arguably denies the right of contribution between responsi-
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if courts impose joint and several liability under Superfund, 11 5 they will,
16
in effect, recognize a right of contribution.'
An alternative for small generators is to institute a class action suit
against the larger generators and the EPA for the cost of the more expensive groundwater cleanup. The smaller companies' optimal remedy
would be a declaratory judgment stating that the larger settling companies and the EPA will be responsible for any future liability imposed
upon them.1 1 7 Indeed, in at least one settlement agreement, the EPA
agreed to defend the settling company against claims for contribution.11 8 Although the EPA disavowed this agreement as a general precedent, the EPA is likely to become involved in further litigation over
settlement agreements and liability for the cost of cleanup operations.
Moreover, actions instituted by smaller generators will diminish the
EPA's ability to negotiate further settlement agreements with any generator-large or small.

ble parties. Subsection 107(e) viewed in its entirety, apparently addresses specific, related
issues. A party can enter into an agreement whereby another person agrees to indemnify him
against any liability imposed under § 107 but he remains personally liable, regardless of the
agreement. However, § 107 does not preclude a party from enforcing an agreement to indemnify him once he has satisfied liability under the section. Because the scenario of multiple
generators potentially liable under § 107, and the issue of contribution among them, do not
fit within the language of § 107(e), one can argue that the section implicitly precludes
contribution.
115 See Note, supra note 2, at 1194.
116 See 126 CONG. REc. H 11,788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) ("A right of contribution is only
of value to a defendant who has been held jointly and severally liable.") (statement submitted
on behalf of the Justice Department by Rep. Florio). See also Faron & Feldman, supra note
113, at 151-52 (If courts impose joint and several liability, "the Government will be able to
proceed against the 'deepest pocket' to recover damages. The 'deepest pocket' would then
have a cause of action against other responsible parties for reimbursement of a proportionate
share of the costs."). If courts ultimately recognize a right of contribution under Superfund,
that right will probably conform to the principles of comparative negligence determined by
federal common law. See United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., No. 80-4-Civ.-7, slip op. at 40
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 17, 1981) ("Considering the strong federal interest in preventing and abating
groundwater pollution and in having a uniform body of applicable law, the federal law
should be applied to claims of contribution and indemnity."); see also Rodburg & Percell,
supra note 113, at 601 ("[Wjhere liability is determined to be joint and several in hazardous
waste litigation under federal statutes, one would expect the federal courts to preserve the
right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, and probably to apply a federal rule in which
contribution is calculated in accordance with comparative negligence principles.").
117 See Moore, supra note 106. Allied brought a declaratory judgment action against
Chem-Dyne and other settling companies that had been using the dumpsite in Hamilton,
Ohio, arguing that the defendants should be responsible for any liability imposed on Allied.
Id
118 See Rodburg & Percell, supra note 113, at 602. This settlement was with Inmont
Corp. for cleanup at the General Disposal site in Santa Fe Springs, California. Id. The EPA
rejected this settlement agreement as a general precedent. Id. (noting that EPA's "Settlement
Guidelines" issued Dec. 18, 1981 disavowed Inmont).
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III
RATIONALES BEHIND THE

EPA's

USE OF ALTERNATIVE

ENFORCEMENT MEASURES

Several reasons underlie the EPA's use of abatement actions and
settlement agreements to combat toxic waste pollution in lieu of federalresponse operations with the statutory fund. First, use of fund monies is
conditioned on the President securing an agreement from the particular
state to pay either ten percent of the long-term remedial action costs or
fifty percent of the response costs if the facility was at any time stateowned. "1 9 In addition, the state must establish an acceptable disposal
facility and assume maintenance of future remedial actions.' 20 Although state sharing of cleanup costs entails certain benefits,' 2' the
states currently lack funding for these costly projects.' 22 Without the
119

42 U.S.C.

120
121

Id

§

9604(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981).

State involvement in hazardous waste cleanup aids in establishing priorities among
waste sites and provides additional money and manpower. See THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT,
supra note 22, at 103.
122 Set EPA Controveriy, State Ability to Raise Money Seen Impeding Superfund Work, 13 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 2030 (Mar. 11, 1983) ("[forty-two] states are having difficulty coming up with
the 10 percent cost share required under the law for Superfund-financed cleanups.").
Congress recognized that the states lacked money for the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites and that the states would look to the federal government for necessary funds. See 126
CONG. REc. H9163 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Moore). R.J. Scrudato, director of the research center of the State University of New York at Oswego, testifying before the
House Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
noted: "Oswego County is currently economically stressed and cannot afford long-term site
monitoring and/or site maintenance." Hearing Witnesses, Final GAO Report Fault EPA Activities
Under Superfund, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 403 (July 23, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearing Witnesses]; see also Mott, Defenses Under Superftmd, NATURAL RESOURcEs L. NEWSLETrER, May
1981, at 1, 18 ("The inability of a state to provide [for the costs of removal in remedial
actions] . . . should legally deprive the federal government of the ability to take remedial
actions."); EPA GuidanceMemorandum on Establishing NationalPriorities Under Superlind Law, 13
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 339 (July 2, 1982) ("In some cases, Federally funded remedial actions may
not be conducted under [Superfund] at a particular site . . . because a State is unable/unwilling to cost share . . . .") [hereinafter cited as Guidance Memorandum].
Some states have raised the money for Superfund cleanup. For example, in 1982 the
state of Washington received $718,000 to clean up its Commencement Bay site. S11 Million
Approved Under Superundfor Cleanup of 10 Hazardous Waste Sites, 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1753
(Apr. 30, 1982).
A bill in the last session of Congress would have loosened state contribution requirements
by making only state owned and operated facilities incur 50% of the cleanup costs. H.R.
6307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982). The bill passed the House, see 128 CONG. REC. H6777
(daily ed. Sept. 8, 1982), but the Senate took no action. See House Approves RCRA Reauthorization, Endorses Regulation of Small Generators, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 627 (Sept. 10, 1982).
Even though Congress has not reduced the state contribution requirements, some support for changing the requirement still exists. For example, George Tyler, New Jersey Assistant Commissioner for Environmental Management, felt that Congress should amend the law
"to give the government some flexibility in establishing the appropriate state share of
superfund cleanups without a mandatory limit." See Government's Update,supra note 87, at 470.
Nevertheless, the EPA would oppose such an amendment. See Administration, Chemical Group
Oppose House RCRA Bill; Senate Working on Changes, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 687, 688 (Sept. 17,
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requisite presidential agreement, Superfund limits federal governmental
cleanup spending to $1 million per site. 123 In light of the high cost of
response and remedial operations, 24 an expenditure of $1 million would
constitute incomplete and ineffective action. State participation requirements thus pose a significant obstacle to federal cleanup efforts.125
Second, federal cleanups are subject to greater regulation than efforts by private companies. Federal cleanup under Superfund must
comply with the National Contingency Plan and numerous other federal regulations, including RCRA. 126 Federal regulations may also require more detailed environmental impact statements before federalresponse operations begin. 27 In contrast, cleanup actions commenced
pursuant to a court-ordered injunction or a settlement agreement face
less stringent requirements.1 28 The government also prefers private industry cleanup actions because they negate the possibility of future chal29
lenges to the necessity and scope of similar government operations.
Third, federal cleanup operations may be more expensive. Generators are often better equipped to undertake more cost-effective and efficient operations. Indeed, avoiding the cost of federal cleanup actions is a
potential incentive for private industry to initiate solutions to the
30
problem.'
Fourth, the EPA seeks abatement actions and settlement agreements because of the highly political nature of the hazardous waste issue. When the EPA obtains a preliminary injunction, the public
perceives that the EPA has responded swiftly to hazardous waste
problems, and the government gains popular approval. In United States
1982) (" '[W]hen a public agency owning a site had a degree of responsibility for activities at
the site,' it should shoulder a large share of the burden for hazards created by those activities.") (quoting Rita Lavelle, former EPA Assistant Administrator).
123 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
124 See supra note 18.
125 See Mott, supra note 122, at 18.
126 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), (c)(4), 9605 (Supp. V 1981); see also Guidance Memorandum,
supra note 122, at 339 (EPA noted that it may conduct Superfund cleanups "because the cost
balancing provisions of the trust fund would preclude federal response").
127
See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1980); see also Mott, supra note 122, at 18
("[S]ome federally funded cleanups may require an Environmental Impact Statement beyond the program EIS contemplated by EPA.").
128 See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also Guidelines, supra note 41, at 20,644.
129
See Mott, supra note 122, at 17. ("Refusal of private parties to undertake actions
beyond 'cost-effective' cleanup may lead to legal showdowns on the scope of the 'proper'
remedy at a specific site.") The EPA will not apply the cost balancing considerations discussed in the National Contingency Plan to proposed cleanup.
130
See Mott, supra note 122, at 1 (noting that important obstacle to Superfund enforcement is "the unwillingness of private parties to sit by idly while the government incurs a huge
cleanup bill on their behalf"); cf Dinkins, supra note 18, at 13 ("The savings in litigation costs
and negative publicity as a result of becoming a defendant in the litigation over a hazardous
waste site represented real incentives to the settling parties.").
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v. Petro Processors,131 the court noted that "taking a public stand on...
[hazardous waste] issues . . .is politically expedient to certain public

officials involved."' 32 Reduced Superfund expenditures also make the
administration's budget deficit appear smaller.' 33 Moreover, fewer federal cleanups advance the current administration's policy of reducing
34
governmental regulation.
In contrast, federal cleanup actions can be politically troublesome.
Delays and excessive regulation, which prevent swift and necessary action, create public criticism. 35 Designating hazardous waste priority
sites across the country places the EPA in a political no-win situation;
rarely are all the groups involved satisfied with a particular location.'

36

Moreover, although Congress intended Superfund to create cooperation
between the EPA and state environmental agencies, 3 7 quarrels often
erupt between the EPA and the states over the use of Superfund mon548 F. Supp. 543 (M.D. La. 1982).
Id at 546.
133 See Former EPA Oftials Saidto CurtailSuperfidSpending to Retain Current Law, 13 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 2307 (Apr. 15, 1983) ("[Ojfficials slowed Superfund expenditures to create the
impression that the $1.6 billion Superfund is adequate and need not be renewed by Congress.1); Report Says Reagan Budgets Less Than HafEPA FoundNecessag in 1980for Superfund, 13
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 884 (Oct. 29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Reagan Budgets Less] ("'This is like
balancing your checking account with poker chips that can only be spent in a casino.' ")
(quoting Sierra Club staffmember).
134
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (requiring cost-benefit
analysis before agency undertakes any regulatory action). One commentator noted that this
cost-benefit approach markedly slowed the pace of regulatory activity during the Reagan
Administration. See Costle, EnvironmentalRegulation and Regulato,7 Reform, 57 WASH. L. REV.
409, 409 (1982). Professor Costle also argued that the Reagan administration's promised reduction of regulation was not the genuine regulatory reform desired by the public. Id See
generalo Reagan, in First Policy Statement, Asks for an EnvironmentalReview, N.Y. Times, July 21,
1982, at A18, col. 1.
135 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, No. 881-2083 (D.D.C. filed Feb.
12, 1982) (environmental group sued EPA for its delay in issuing National Contingency Plan
required by 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (Supp. V 1981)); supra note 30 (discussing delays encountered
in designating priorities for hazardous waste sites).
136
For example, if the EPA designates a certain waste site as 50 on its priority list, some
politicians will argue that the site should have had a higher priority, whereas others will deny
that the EPA should have given the site any priority. See 13,000 Toxic Waste Dumps, supra note
30; see also Government's Update, supra note 87, at 470 (Jeffrey R. Diver, Senior Environmental
counsel for Waste Management Inc., expresed concern about "political or publicity motivations" for designating sites for emergency response).
137 See Guidelines, supra note 41, at 20,664. See generally Florini, Issues of Federalism in
Hazardous Waste Control Cooperation or Confusion?, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 307, 323 (1982)
(noting that "in order to bring sites up to applicable environmental regulations, states may be
forced to spend their own money to continue work at sites at which cleanup began under
Superfund."). The EPA also needs the cooperation of other federal offices to successfully
carry out its Superfund mandate. See Lavelle Says Most Second Quarter Targets Under Superfund
Law Being Met or Exceeded, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 101 (May 28, 1982). EPA has already
entered into six interagency agreements with five federal entities involving over $7 million in
funds to support Superfund activities. The governmental units are the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Health & Human Services, the Coast Guard, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
131

132
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ies.138 The EPA's use of abatement actions and settlement agreements

can help avoid these political disputes.
Fifth, the EPA's use of abatement actions and settlement agreements indicates the urgency of the problem that hazardous waste sites
present. Congress recognized the gravity of the problem when it enacted Superfund.' 39 When lack of state commitment and administration policies thwart the use of Superfund monies, 140 EPA abatement
actions and settlement agreements are often the most realistic and immediate responses to hazardous waste problems.141

Sixth, the EPA prefers to use preliminary injunctions because they
avoid some of the flaws in application of Superfund. The statute, for
example, does not explicitly impose strict liability 142 or joint and several
liability,14 3 even though both ideas were proposed in Congress. 144 Additionally, the size of the Fund restricts its use, thus encouraging the EPA
to seek alternative enforcement methods. t45 The original Senate
Superfund bill provided for a $4.1 billion fund, but legislative compromise decreased the fund to $1.6 billion.146 The EPA has estimated that
138 Disputes concerning Superfund monies arise between the states and the EPA because
the states do not work with the EPA to designate priority waste sites. See Guidance Memorandum, supra note 122, at 339. Rather, they are given the opportunity to modify the scores in the
EPA's priority lists only after they are published. Id at 340.
Further controversy may ensue at the state level when competition between money
claims for in-state waste sites occurs. See Mott, supra note 122, at 18. This competition will
usually occur when the cleanup cost for a site exceeds $1 million because at that point
Superfund requires the state to fund a share of the cleanup costs before federal remedial
operations begin. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 119-24, 132-34 and accompanying text.
141 See 13,000 Toxic Waste Dumps, supra note 30. An estimated 1,200 to 2,000 sites creating
recognized health hazards exist in the United States. Id
142 See Dore,supra note 57, at 275-78;see also Hinds,supra note 45, at 33 (scope of liability
not clear); Comment, supra note 8, at 1278-79.
143 See Note, supra note 2, at 1158; Comment, supra note 8, at 1273.
144 S. REP. No. 480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 126 CONG. REc. S14,938-40 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1980).
145 See Comment, supra note 8, at 1232 ("The importance of replenishing the fund under
the Superfund scheme should not be minimized. The fund is of limited size, and its monies
will be exhausted quickly, thwarting future cleanup efforts, unless Superfund's new liabilityassessing provisions succeed.") (footnote omitted); see also New EPA Land DisposalRegulations,
supra note 99, at 529 (Steven Ramsey states that if EPA uses fund as backup to settlement
efforts, "we quickly will exhaust it').
There are proposals pending in Congress to extend the Superfund legislation for five
additional years and to provide for five percent increases in funding levels after September 30,
1985. See H.R. 1615, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also Lafalce Introduces Bill to Extend
Superfund Through 1990, Increase Monies, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2010 (Mar. 4, 1983).
146 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Senator Stafford admitted that the compromise eliminated "75 percent of what we were seeking." Senate Passes $1.6 Billion Superfind No
CompensationProvidedfor Victims, 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1097 (Nov. 28, 1980). The decrease in
the Fund's size especially helped industry because industry finances the Fund through taxes.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Indeed, a report by Public Citizen's Congress Watch
examined the money received by Congressmen relating to the Superfund maneuvering and
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cleanup of the projected 1,200 to 2,000 waste disposal sites, which
threaten health and the environment, would cost between $26 and $44
billion. 147
Finally, the lack of standards in section 106 encourages the EPA to
obtain preliminary injunctions under that section. The clear intent of
Congress to develop immediate responses to the hazardous waste problem, 48 in combination with the vague standards of the section, encourages broad application of injunctive relief. 149 Section 106's equitable
provision, for example, could permit injunctions against off-site nonnegligent generators, the most remote defendants possible in this type of
litigation 50 and authorize the most flexible, costly remedies.151 Under
section 106, courts can also assess a $5,000 per day fine against a defendant who fails to comply with an EPA administrative order. 152
IV
PREDICTED DIRECTIONS FOR SUPERFUND ENFORCEMENT

A.

The Courts' Broad Interpretation of Section 106

Hazardous waste cleanup may continue under abatement actions
and settlement agreements if federal courts adopt the government's interpretation of Superfund. Liberal construction of Superfund, and particularly section 106, is advantageous to the extent that it enables the
EPA to seek cleanup by the parties responsible for hazardous waste
problems before recourse to either extensive litigation or the Fund. 53 In
addition, public abatement suits offer the best means of spreading the
54
cost of hazardous waste cleanup.1
Nevertheless, courts must overcome certain obstacles before they
can broadly apply section 106. Courts must refute the logic of both the
found that "large campaign contributions by the chemical industry illustrate their heavyhanded efforts to thwart this critical legislation." See Group Says Chemical FundsRecipients Lead
Opposition to Superfind Proposal, I1 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 668 (Sept. 5, 1980) (quoting Ralph
Nader).
147
See supra note 18.
148
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 70, 80 and accompanying text.
151
The most flexible remedies would include diagnostic studies financed by the generator. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
152
42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (Supp. V 1981). Section 106 also permits the assessment of treble
damages if a defendant disobeys an administrative order. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (Supp. V
1981); see also Dinkins, supra note 18, at 15.
153
Commentators have noted the importance of the interpretation of § 106 to the government's entire enforcement scheme. See N. Orloff & K. Rubin, Superfund and the Courts, I
ENVTL. L.F. 5, 8 (1983) ("[T]he interpretation of section 106 . . . will substantially affect
both the pace and reach of the Superfund program.").
154
See Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L. REv. 584, 603-04
(1981).
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court in UnitedStates v. Wade1 55 and some commentators 156 advocating a

narrower interpretation of section 106. The strict constructionists argue
that preliminary injunctions have traditionally been available only in
the most limited circumstances. 57 Moreover, they contend that even if
congressional intent implies liberal use of abatement actions, such use is
inconsistent with the comprehensive scope of Superfund; liberal application of section 106 obviates the need for sections 104 and 107158 and
avoids expending fund monies.' 59 The Wade court thus found that Congress intended sections 104 and 106 to serve specific purposes 60 and
held that section 106 was not an alternative route for EPA cleanup of
hazardous waste sites. 161 The availability of sections 104 and 107, in
lieu of traditional equitable principles, 62 limits the scope of section
106.163 Because Congress permitted the EPA to commence cleanup action immediately and subsequently recoup the monies used, courts
should arguably compel the EPA to take that course of action, rather
155 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
156 See Frost & Cross, supra note 40, at 12.
157 See supra note 49 (federal common law standards under which preliminary injunctions
are issued). See general45 Leubsdorf, supra note 59.
158 See United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982); cf. Frost & Cross, supra
note 40, at 10 ("The establishment of the Fund and presence of an alternative means for
cleaning up hazardous waste sites in section 104 makes a liberal standard for section 106 less
essential for public health protection."). Liberal use of § 104's lower imminent-and-substantial-danger standard permits the use of fund monies for the protection of public health and
the environment. Congress intended §.104 to work in tandem with § 107, which replenishes
the Fund by placing liability on private parties for cleanup costs. See H.R. RE.tP. No. 1016,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at 33, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6119, 6136
("Section [107] would establish a federal cause of action for liability for the costs of emergency assistance, removal, and containment action undertaken pursuant to section [104].");
see also United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1982). However, in United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (D. Minn. 1982), the court held
that liability under § 107 was independent of the cooperative agreement called for by § 104.
159 See United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 794 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In any event,
parties have rarely used the money available under § 107. Neither of the two cases filed
under § 107 involved a claim seeking recovery from the Fund. United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co.,
544 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Also, in United States v. Petro-Processors Inc., 548 F.
Supp. 543 (M.D. La. 1982), the court encouraged the parties to solicit money from Superfund
so that cleanup of the site could commence immediately. Id at 546. Yet, "the State of Louisiana failed or refused to request superfund money to be used for the site in question." Id.
The court, "never received a satisfactory explanation why." Id
160 546 F. Supp. at 794.
161 Id One court also applied this reasoning in construing § 311 of the Clean Water Act.
United States v. Bums, 512 F. Supp. 916,919 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("If the Government could get
an unlimited recovery under other statutes, the balance of section 311 would be meaningless."). The court in Bumr relied on United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736, 748
(5th Cir. 1980) which held that § 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is the
government's exclusive means of recovering cleanup costs. The court in United States v.
Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982), presumably applied similar reasoning.
162 See supra notes 49, 59.
163 See United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 794 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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than allowing it to seek injunctive relief under section 106.164
Courts must also overcome the argument that the use of section 106
as a source of regular, substantive liability may be unconstitutional. At
least one commentator has suggested a "void for vagueness" attack on
section 106 given the broad and uncertain reach of the section.165 Given
such an unclear mandate from Congress, expansive use of section 106
might also be void as an unlawful delegation of legislative powers. 166 In
finding substantive, flexible standards in section 106, the courts may indeed be using it to legislate solutions to hazardous waste problems.
B.

Congressional Action

The EPA's neglect of Superfund's "revolving-door" fund suggests a
need for further congressional action.' 67 The limited amount of the
Fund, which prevents the EPA from undertaking the majority of necessary cleanup operations, 16 together with state contribution requirements 169 and EPA policy has stymied the use of fund monies in
enforcing Superfund's provisions. For example, the EPA failed to appropriate all the fund monies available to it for fiscal years 1981-82.170
Further, the EPA's failure to publish statutorily mandated regulations
171
on time has slowed its enforcement of Superfund.
Id
165 See Hinds, supra note 45, at 33 n.256; cf United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785
(E.D. Pa. 1982). In interpreting § 7003 of RCRA, the court noted that "[m]ore fundamentally, a court may not base a decision to impose liability on such a potentially vast group of
defendants. . . on the basis of the conflicting and fragmentary legislative history of section
7003." Id at 791 (citing United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138,
143-44 (N.D. Ind. 1980)).
166
During the Superfund debates, Congressman Stockman introduced a substitute bill
for H.R. 7020, hinting that H.R. 7020 would constitute an unlawful delegation. See 126
CONG. Rsc. H9439 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). He argued that H.R. 7020 contained "an
enabling act that delegates open-ended, unlimited, undefined powers to the [EPA]." Id
167 One can view Superfund as a "revolving-door" fund because Congress intended that
monies obtained from future lawsuits under § 107 would replenish the funds available for use
under § 104. See Ohioexre. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
("Congress [intended] that the fund would be maintained as a revolving fund for advancing
the costs of these clean up operations while litigation progressed."). Government action taken
under § 104 does not, however, explicitly depend upon a future lawsuit under § 107. Id at 29
("This Court concludes that a [§ 107] action might be brought where Superfund response
authority does not exist under [§ 104]."). Nevertheless, once the EPA has used the $1.6 billion fund provided for in § 104, Congress must either appropriate more money to the Fund,
or the EPA must receive the money from § 107 suits. See also supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 99, 121-25, 134 and accompanying text.
170 A congressional oversight committee found an unused $180 million surplus. See Implementation Hearhgs,supra note 3, at 4 (statement of Rep. Florio). The EPA, nevertheless,
referred more cases under Superfund to the Justice Department in October 1982 than in the
entire first quarter of fiscal 1982. EPA Superfund Referrals to justice in October Top First Part of
164

Fiscal 1982, 13 ENV'T REP. 1029 (Nov. 12, 1982).

171

For example, the EPA published the National Contingency Plan mandated by § 105
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The infeasibility of the "revolving-door" fund has prompted the
EPA to use section 106 injunctions and settlement agreements. 172 These
enforcement methods, however, have shortcomings of their own, 173 including the obstacles to a liberal interpretation of section 106.174
Congress can provide a partial solution to Superfund's enforcement
problems by legislating more effective provisions for the EPA and the
courts to implement. 175 In particular, new legislation would clarify the
present ambiguities in section 106176 and largely eliminate the uncer177
tainty surrounding application of that section.
With these problems in mind, Congress should enact new legislation specifically authorizing extensive abatement actions against generators, transporters, and disposal site operators. That legislation should
explicitly impose strict liability on these parties for the cost of remedying
waste hazards, as long as those hazards exist. 178 The new statute should
only after considerable delay, in response to a court order. See Environmental Defense Fund
v. Gorsuch, No. 881-2083 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 12, 1982). One commentator suggested that the
legislative veto in the Act delayed its implementation. See James, infra note 175, at 344. The
EPA also has implemented health commissions and studies under Superfund inadequately.
See Government's Update, supra note 87, at 469 ("[T]he five or six health studies currently underway began before the law was enacted, and that disease registries, literature surveys, and
health surveys have not been established.') (paraphrasing Sen. Stafford, Chairman of the
Senate Environmental and Public Works Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution).
172 See supra notes 119-47 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 39-83, 106-18 and accompanying text; see also infra note 182. Extensive
litigation is one major disadvantage of seeking injunctive relief. The EPA refers cases to the
Department of Justice and then four agencies must approve the decision to seek injunctive
relief-the Department of Justice, the EPA, the regional EPA, and the state environment
agency. Presentation by Erica Dolgin, Attorney, Dep't of Justice, Land & Natural Resources
Division (Cornell School of Engineering May 2, 1983). Moreover, litigation is resource-intensive: it consumes time and money. The limited number of lawyers in these agencies will be
unable to handle numerous § 106 actions unless Congress streamlines those actions by removing barriers to liability.
174 See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
175
Other commentators have also suggested further congressional legislation regulating
hazardous waste disposal. See Note, supra note 24, at 1058 ("Neither the superfund nor the
other modern environmental statutes place the costs of waste management squarely upon
those who need the financial incentive to oversee and to ensure proper hazardous waste disposal.'); see also James, Developments in Hazardous Waste Management, 22 URB. L. ANN. 330, 345
(1981) ("Still needed. . . are devices to assure that those responsible for hazardous substance
injuries will bear the costs and that those harmed will receive compensation.").
Senator Stafford, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public
Works, commented that "the same tragedies which led to enactment in the first place will
likely lead to second, third, or fourth enactments until, finally the law is fully implemented
and enforced." Super.nd Must Be Implemented or Face Multiple Reenactments Stafford Warns, 13
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 282 (June 25, 1982); see also United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 794
n.22 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("Congress, and not this Court must legislate a remedy adequate to the
scope of the problem.').
176 See supra notes 39-83 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
178 See Note, supra note 24, at 1080; see also Note, supra note 154, at 588 ("All firms associated with the generation or handling of hazardous wastes should be strictly liable for costs
shown to have been caused by those wastes.'); Note, Strict Liabilityfor Generators, Transporters,
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also authorize modified joint and several liability plans179 to determine
the liability of all parties involved in abatement actions. 8 0 Additionally, the new legislation should not contain a statute of limitations for
abatement actions because the full extent of damages to human health
81
and the environment may not be known for many years.'
New legislation would necessarily entail two immediate policy
changes for the EPA. First, the EPA should use settlement agreements
only sparingly in conjunction with its abatement actions.18 2 Moreover,
any new settlement agreements that are negotiated should not release
the polluters absolutely from liability; the EPA should instead pursue a
consistent policy toward bifurcated settlements. 8 3 The new legislation
should further require the EPA to issue a detailed annual report concerning its enforcement activities so that Congress can more closely scrutinize those activities.' 8 4 Such a provision would not only relieve
and Disposersof Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REv. 949, 985 (1980) ("Strict liability offers the
only viable method of providing common law compensation to victims" of improper disposal
of hazardous wastes.).
179 A modified joint and several liability plan is one that provides for a right of contribution. For a discussion of joint and several liability and the right of contribution under the
existing statute, see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
180 See Rodburg & Percell,supra note 113, at 601; see also Comment, supra note 8, at 1279
(advocating adoption of uniform and detailed federal rule on joint and several liability, and
arguing that "[tihe courts should not seize isolated interpretations of the ambiguous statutory
language on this issue to justify strict adherence to either the old or the modern common law
rule regarding joint and several liability"). But cf Note, supra note 2, at 1195 (advocating
"adoption of a joint and several strict liability standard as a principle of federal common
law").
181 See Note, supra note 154, at 589 ("[A] waste generator's liability for costs stemming
from its activities should be coextensive with the hazardous life of the wastes plus the time
reasonably necessary to discover the injuries caused by the wastes."); cf.Panel Told All Landfills
Leak, EPA Rules On Hazardous Waste LandDisposalnadequate,13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1276 (Dec.
3, 1982) (panel of scientists, technicians and EPA official recently told House subcommittee
that EPA regulations are inadequate because all hazardous waste landfills eventually leak
contaminants).
182 In addition to the drawbacks to settlement agreements discussed earlier, supra notes
106-18 and accompanying text, such agreements also have the following disadvantages: (1) a
court cannot prescribe statutory monetary penalties as it can under administrative orders; (2)
if an agreement is not fulfilled, the agency cannot obtain immediate injunctive relief and
must start new legal proceedings without the legitimacy of an administrative order; and (3)
settlements do not insulate parties from citizen suits. See EPA Ofiial,supra note 100, at 1055.
But cf Ruckelshaus Assures Senate Committee He Has Full Authority to Enforce the Laws, 14 EN'"T
REP. (BNA) 3 (May 6, 1983) ("The agency cannot afford to settle every pollution cleanup
case in court . . . . [S]ettlements should be set up, however, to be sure they are being carried
out in the public interest .... ") (paraphrasing Ruckelshaus in testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Environment and Public Works).
183 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
184 A. Blakeman Early, lobbyist for the Sierra Club environmental group, made this suggestion after a Club report determined that only 98 sites would be cleaned up by October
1983 instead of a projected 265. See Report Says Reagan Budgets Less than HalfEPA FoundNecessag in 1980for Superftnd, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 884-85 (Oct. 29, 1982). Rita Lavelle, former
EPA Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, called the Sierra
Club report "totally inaccurate," but conceded that Superfund "frankly is taking a lot longer
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Congress of its need to subpoena EPA documents, but would facilitate
cooperation between the two bodies.185
Congress should thus recognize the unworkability of the present
statutory scheme and modify it to allow more extensive abatement actions. These actions, however, will not work in all cases. Where the
EPA cannot find the responsible party or one that is solvent, it must
immediately undertake cleanup at that site under section 104. The government should maintain a fund for such cleanup through direct appropriations or taxes on generators, 8 6 rather than through damages
received from future lawsuits under section 107.
Congress should, however, retain some aspects of the present statutory scheme, particularly in the area of state activity. Even if Congress
abolishes or lowers the state contribution requirements, 18 7 state enforcement activity is still crucial to effective environmental regulation.1 88
than we thought it would." Id at 885. Similarly, a GAO report noted "[w]e believe that
EPA will have few cleanup experiences to report by December 1984." See Hearing Witnesses,
supra note 122, at 404.
185
Superfund required "a comprehensive report on experience with [its] implementation." 42 U.S.C. § 9651(a) (1) (Supp. V 1981). Nevertheless, to discover how the EPA enforced Superfund, Congress had to subpoena the EPA for over 700,000 documents that
discussed and assessed hazardous waste enforcement, litigation, and settlement strategies. See
Attorney General Cites Executive Privilege on Superfund Documents to Two House Panels, 13 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 1275 (Dec. 3, 1982). When the EPA failed to comply with the subpoena, Congress held EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch in contempt. See House Votes to Find Gorsuch in
Contempt;JusticeSues House to Block FurtherAction, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1435 (Dec. 24, 1982).
The documents were subsequently released and Anne Gorsuch, who married to become Anne
McGill Burford, resigned. See After Burford- What Net for EPA?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 21, 1983, at 25-26.
186 The EPA's draft Economic Impact Analysis of the RCRA hazardous waste regulations identified 17 major waste generating industries. Yet chemical and oil industry taxes
supply the major portion of the Fund. Thus, the Fund arguably imposes liability on a narrow
group of industries that have less of a causal nexus with the creation of the hazardous waste
problem than other waste generating industries.
Recently, the Supreme Court scrutinized more closely industry-based fees for this causal
nexus. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court upheld the
Black Lung Benefits Act, which taxed the coal industry for the medical expenses of black lung
disease victims. The Justices upheld the compensatory scheme as a rational allocation to the
producers of an "actual, measurable cost of [their] business." Id at 19. The industry nexus
between generators of hazardous waste and site disposal problems is in some cases more tenuous than the connection between the coal industry and black lung disease. If the court were to
find an insufficient nexus, administration of the Fund might raise due process concerns and
thus be considered unconstitutional. This does not seem likely, however, given the broad
reading of nexus in TurnerElkhorn Mining. Id at 19-20; see also Comment, supra note 8, at 1247
(due process argument lacks real merit). But see Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton, 295 U.S.
330 (1935); State Dep't of Env't Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 479, 376
A.2d 1339, 1344 (1977) (legislature intended act and causative nexus to be present between
discharger and dischargee in New Jersey Spill Control Act).
187 See supra note 122.
188 See Eichbaum, State and Federal Environmental Enforcement, in ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMEINT 8 (1978) (Selected Readings prepared in Conjunction with the Seventh Annual
Conference on the Environment by the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Environmental Law) (noting declining role of states in environmental enforcement, detailing
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States should continue to participate in removal and remedial actions
by joining their claims against defendants in EPA abatement actions
and negotiating in EPA settlement agreements. Congress should also
encourage state legislatures to adopt their own laws regulating disposal
89
of hazardous wastes.'
CONCLUSION

In enforcing Superfund, the EPA has not followed Congress's intended plan--cleanup of hazardous waste dumps using a fund replenished with awards from litigation involving waste generators. Because
this "revolving-door" fund has proved unworkable, the EPA has
brought abatement actions under section 106 and has negotiated settlement agreements to force private cleanups.
These enforcement methods, however, have major drawbacks of
their own. The ambiguities of section 106 have allowed some courts to
interpret the section broadly and grant injunctive relief, while other
courts have chosen to construe the section strictly and force the EPA to
use its limited resources to clean up waste sites under sections 104 and
107. Generators of hazardous wastes are left justifiably confused over the
scope of their liability under Superfund. Further confusion is likely to
result from challenges questioning the basis of the EPA's settlement
agreements and its litigation policies.
Congress could let courts continue to struggle with the ambiguities
in Superfund. This course of action, however, would take too much
time; hazardous waste pollution is a serious threat calling for immediate
action. Congress therefore should enact new legislation dispelling the
present uncertainties in Superfund enforcement and mandating extensive abatement actions. The EPA could then design its policy to enforce
effectively the legislation and remedy the problems created by hazardous waste.
Ann K Pollock

many reasons why continued state involvement is vital, and suggesting that federal government assume full funding of state environmental agencies).
189 The New York state legislature recently adopted a state superfund which will raise
$10 million annually to clean up inactive waste dumps. Hazardous Wastes-Remedial
Funds To Clean Up Inactive Waste Sites, 1982 N.Y. Laws ch. 857 (codified at N.Y. ENVTL
CONSERv. LAW 27-1303 to - 1319 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). The New Jersey legislature has
also enacted a state superfund. See Hazardous Discharge Bond Act, 1981 N.J. Sess. Law
Serv. ch. 275 (West).

